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Overview 
  
New Annenberg survey results indicate that marketers are misrepresenting a large majority of 
Americans by claiming that Americans give out information about themselves as a tradeoff for benefits 
they receive. To the contrary, the survey reveals most Americans do not believe that ‘data for discounts’ 
is a square deal. 
  
The findings also suggest, in contrast to other academics’ claims, that Americans’ willingness to provide 
personal information to marketers cannot be explained by the public’s poor knowledge of the ins and 
outs of digital commerce.  In fact, people who know more about ways marketers can use their personal 
information are more likely rather than less likely to accept discounts in exchange for data when 
presented with a real-life scenario. 
 
Our findings, instead, support a new explanation: a majority of Americans are resigned to giving up their 
data—and that is why many appear to be engaging in tradeoffs.  Resignation occurs when a person 
believes an undesirable outcome is inevitable and feels powerless to stop it.  Rather than feeling able to 
make choices, Americans believe it is futile to manage what companies can learn about them.  Our study 
reveals that more than half do not want to lose control over their information but also believe this loss of 
control has already happened.  
 
By misrepresenting the American people and championing the tradeoff argument, marketers give 
policymakers false justifications for allowing the collection and use of all kinds of consumer data often 
in ways that the public find objectionable. Moreover, the futility we found, combined with a broad 
public fear about what companies can do with the data, portends serious difficulties not just for 
individuals but also—over time—for the institution of consumer commerce. 
 
 
Marketers justify their data-collection practices with the notion of tradeoffs, depicting an informed 
public that understands the opportunities and costs of giving up its data and makes the positive decision 
to do so.  A 2014 Yahoo report, for example, concluded that online Americans “demonstrate a 
willingness to share information, as more consumers begin to recognize the value and self-benefit of 
allowing advertisers to use their data in the right way.”1 This image of a powerful consumer has become 
a way to claim to policymakers and the media that Americans accept widespread tracking of their 
backgrounds, behaviors, and lifestyles across devices, even though surveys repeatedly show they object 
to these activities.  
  
Our study challenges the assertion that tradeoffs explains what most Americans are doing.  With the 
help of Princeton Survey Research Associates International, we conducted a representative national cell 
phone and wireline phone survey of 1,506 Americans age 18 and older who use the internet or email “at 
least occasionally.”  We presented them with everyday circumstances where marketers collect people’s 
data, phrasing the situations as tradeoffs— and learned that very many feel those tradeoffs are unfair.  
  
• 91% disagree (77% of them strongly) that “If companies give me a discount, it is a fair exchange for 
them to collect information about me without my knowing.” 
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• 71% disagree (53% of them strongly) that “It’s fair for an online or physical store to monitor what I’m 
doing online when I’m there, in exchange for letting me use the store’s wireless internet, or Wi-Fi, 
without charge.”  
• 55% disagree (38% of them strongly) that “It’s okay if a store where I shop uses information it has 
about me to create a picture of me that improves the services they provide for me.” 
  
Further analysis of these responses indicate only a very small percentage of Americans agree with the 
overall concept of tradeoffs. In fact, only about 4% agree or agree strongly with all three propositions.  
If we use a broader definition of a belief in tradeoffs— the average value of all three statements—even 
then only 21% of the respondents accept the idea.  Yet, when we present a real-life tradeoff case—
asking Americans whether they would take discounts in exchange for allowing their supermarket to 
collect information about their grocery purchases —43%, or more than twice as many as in the broader 
definition of tradeoff supporters, say yes to tradeoffs.” Underscoring the inconsistency, we found that 
40% of the people who said they would accept the grocery-discount deal do not agree with the third 
tradeoff statement above even though the type of exchange it suggests is similar.  
 
What is going on? 
 
Contrary to the claim that a majority of Americans consent to discounts because the commercial benefits 
are worth the costs, our study suggests a new explanation for what has thus far been misconstrued as 
“tradeoff” behavior in the digital world: a large pool of Americans feel resigned to the inevitability of 
surveillance and the power of marketers to harvest their data.  People who are resigned do not 
predictably decide to give up their data.  We actually found no statistical relationship between being 
resigned to marketers’ use of data and accepting or rejecting various kinds of supermarket 
discounts.  Rather, the larger percentages of people in the population who are resigned compared to 
people who believe in principle that tradeoffs are a fair deal indicate that in the real world people who 
give up their data are more likely to do it while resigned rather than as the result of cost-benefit 
analysis. Marketers would have all these behaviors categorized as a rational acceptance of tradeoffs. But 
when we looked in our scenario at the people who agreed to give up their data for supermarket 
discounts, we found that 57% of those who took the deal were resigned, while even using the broader 
understanding of tradeoff support only 32% were “tradeoff” supporters.   
 
To further question marketers’ emphasis on Americans’ use of cost-benefit calculations, we found that 
large percentages of Americans often don’t have the basic knowledge to make informed cost-benefit 
choices about ways marketers use their information.  Reinforcing these inaccuracies, large percentages 
of Americans overestimate the extent to which the government protects them from discriminatory 
pricing—companies changing prices from person to person based on those individuals’ consumer 
profiles.   For example: 
  
• 49% of American adults who use the internet believe (incorrectly) that by law a supermarket must 
obtain a person’s permission before selling information about that person’s food purchases to other 
companies. 
• 69% do not know that a pharmacy does not legally need a person’s permission to sell information 
about the over-the-counter drugs that person buys. 
• 65% do not know that the statement “When a website has a privacy policy, it means the site will not 
share my information with other websites and companies without my permission” is false.  
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• 55% do not know it is legal for an online store to charge different people different prices at the same 
time of day. 
• 62% do not know it is legal for an offline or physical store to charge different people different prices at 
the same time of day. 
• 62% do not know that price-comparison sites like Expedia or Orbitz are not legally required to include 
the lowest travel prices. 
  
These misconceptions suggest that even when Americans do weigh the costs and benefits of giving up 
their data, they frequently base those choices on incorrect information.  Ironically, and contrary to many 
academic claims about the reason people give up their information, those who know the most about 
these marketing practices are more likely to be resigned.  Moreover, resigned people’s decisions to 
accept supermarket discounts even when the supermarket collects increasingly personal information are 
also positively related to knowledge.  When it comes to protecting their personal data, our survey finds 
those with the wherewithal to accurately calculate the costs and benefits of privacy are likely to consider 
their efforts futile. 
  
As U.S. society moves further into the twenty-first century, personalized deals and prices will become 
common both online and in physical stores. These sorts of tailored offers will undoubtedly be 
increasingly troubling to Americans who believe they are on the losing end of often-hidden consumer 
profiles and targeting formulas. Suspicion already abounds: 72% of Americans reject the idea that “what 
companies know about me from my behavior online cannot hurt me.” It is not difficult to predict 
widespread social tensions, and concerns about democratic access to the marketplace, if Americans 
continue to be resigned to a lack of control over how, when, and what marketers learn about them. At 
the end of this report, we offer suggestions for turning this trend around and moving from a society 
where people have little hope for control over their everyday data to one in which the expectation—and 
reality—of control is part of transparent and responsible commercial transactions.  
 
 
Background 
 
Public opinion polls repeatedly find that consumers are concerned about ways marketers access and use 
their data online and offline.  A 2005 national public opinion telephone survey from the University of 
Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School found 66% of internet-using adults did not agree “It’s okay with me 
if supermarket I shop at keeps detailed records of my buying behavior.”2 Close to a decade later, a 2014 
Pew study found 80% of social network site users in a nationally representative online poll of adult 
Americans answered they were concerned “that some of the information you share on social networking 
sites might be accessed by third parties like advertisers or businesses, without your knowledge.”3 And in 
2015 the Bain & Company consultancy reported on a survey it conducting of “more than 900 
consumers” that found that “they are often uncomfortable with how their data is used and shared.  A full 
two-thirds feel that it should be illegal for companies to collect or use such data without getting prior 
consent.”4 
 
At the same time, academic and business observers concur that people often release information about 
themselves in ways that suggest much less concern about disclosure and collection of their personal data 
than the polls depict.  Some have termed this gap the privacy paradox.5  It’s the idea that, as reporter 
Brad Stone wrote in The New York Times, “normally sane people have inconsistent and contradictory 
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impulses and opinions when it comes to their safeguarding their own private information.”6 So, for 
example, a 2015 Accenture online survey found 60 percent of shoppers want real-time promotions, 
which often depend on sophisticated commercial surveillance.  Yet, the same survey found, only 20 
percent want retailers to know their location and just 14 percent are comfortable sharing their browsing 
history.7  
 
Some observers read this paradox as evidence that people don’t actually care about privacy or, 
alternatively, that they privilege other things – convenience, discounts, social connections –above 
privacy.8  Marketers have embraced this seeming contradiction as a way to argue in favor of wide-
ranging data collection.  The McCann Worldwide advertising network’s Truth Central project derived 
this conclusion from “a global research study surveying over 10,000 people in eleven countries,” 
including the U.S.  Not breaking down the results by country or detailing the survey method, McCann 
stated that while “71% worry about the amount online stores know about them, 65% are willing to share 
their data as long as they understand the benefits for them.”9   
 
The editor for mCommerceDaily interpreted the findings to mean that “the tracking of consumers all 
comes down to the trade-off in value.”10  
 
Along the same lines, the president and chief strategy officer of Mobiquity, a mobile-strategy 
consultancy, wrote in 2012 that “the average person is more than willing to share their information with 
companies if these organizations see the overall gain for end-users as a goal, not just for themselves.”11 
A May 2014 report by Yahoo Advertising followed this logic in interpreting its survey of “6,000 
respondents ages 13-64, a representative sample of the U.S. online population.”12 It highlighted the 
finding that “Roughly two-thirds of consumers find it acceptable or are neutral to marketers using online 
behavior or information to craft better ads….”  Digitally connected Americans, the study concluded, 
“demonstrate a willingness to share information, as more consumers begin to recognize the value and 
self-benefit of allowing advertisers to use their data in the right way.” 
 
A few corporate voices have put cautions around such generalizations.  An Accenture executive said “If 
retailers approach and market personalization as a value exchange, and are transparent in how the data 
will be used, consumers will likely be more willing to engage and trade their personal data.”13  Bain 
interpreted the results of its survey to mean that “customers’ trust cannot be bought by companies 
offering compensation in exchange for selling or sharing personal data.” And the Brand Bond Loyalty 
consulting firm suggested the importance of “greater transparency of data policies and practices that are 
communicated clearly and concisely to consumers and [loyalty] program members.”14  Yet none of these 
companies explained what exactly they mean by transparency; nor did they give examples of how 
transparency could be built into advertising systems that rely on the capture and analysis of personal 
information.  Bain answered its clients’ crucial question “how can companies acquire customer data 
while building customer loyalty at the same time?” by answering vaguely “Ask permission.”  Brand 
Bond focused its report on its more central topic: emphasizing how knowledge of personal information 
about customers allows for personalized messages and offers which, in turn, “are likely to achieve 
incremental business results.”  These results include, it claimed, customers being three times as likely to 
spend more with the brand, less price-sensitive, and four times as likely “to buy something they don’t 
want or need in order to earn points or maintain their program status.”15 
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Like the Brand Bond report, Yahoo Advertising’s underscored that “This concept of value exchange for 
personal data is starting to come to life through personalization.”16  In fact, for an increasing number of 
marketers, from finance companies to retailers, personalization is the next step in sophisticated targeting.  
Yahoo notes its personalization technology tracks individuals’ online behaviors (their “click history”) 
and then factors in “online activity typical of [that person’s] demographic cohort.”17  Statistical 
consultants, media-buying agencies, major advertisers, and major retail establishments have accepted 
this basic approach and adapted it to their needs.  The common goal involves predictive analytics—the 
manipulation of huge amounts of data about individuals to assess the likelihood that a particular kind of 
content or product will lead them act in a direction desired by the marketer.   
 
The data for these new forms of targeting can come from sources that may be obvious to the reader, 
viewer, or customer: registration on a site, requests for information, or perhaps the use of coupons.  
Increasingly, though, marketers are collecting hundreds of data points, accurate and not, about 
individuals in ways that are far more hidden from view.  Read a typical retail chain’s privacy policy, and 
you may well find that in the interest of personalization the merchant  
 
 buys information from database firms to add to its data about individual customers;  
 uses cookies and similar elements to follow people’s behaviors on sites and in emails as well as 
to infer their interests across sites;  
 allows advertising networks it works with to collect data about individuals coming to the site; 
 tracks people’s location on their mobile devices without explicit permission unless they turn that 
feature off;  
 collects a person’s comments from a product review, question, or other information on its 
website, app or social-network pages; and 
 allows buttons from Facebook, Twitter, Pinterest, Youtube, FourSquare and other social-media 
sites that collect information about individuals and place trackers on their computers. 
 
To add further to their stores of knowledge, increasing numbers of physical stores install tools that use 
Wi-Fi, Bluetooth Low Energy, ultrasonic and other technologies to identify individual customers’ 
presence, track their movements, offer them personalized coupons or other messages, and link that 
information to everything else they know about them. 
 
Marketers enthuse over the idea that people’s acceptance of the general idea of tradeoffs justifies 
marketers’ collection of enough data points about consumers to lead to the kind of personalization 
Yahoo calls “the pathway to advertising nirvana.”18  Privacy advocates and researchers, by contrast, 
have challenged the assertion that people make rational calculations when they “opt-in” to privacy-
atrophying services. These groups argue that decisions about information disclosure are not as prone to 
contradictions between their expressed attitudes and their actions as the privacy paradox would suggest. 
Instead they have argued that individuals want to manage their data but lack the necessary knowledge to 
make informed decisions about the consequences of entering into interactions with marketers.19  
 
From surveys, content analyses, and experiments academic researchers have argued the public is largely 
unable to understand what marketers are doing with their data behind the computer screen. For example, 
eight Annenberg School surveys from 1999 through 2012 have consistently shown that while Americans 
are quite aware that marketers are collecting data about them and are wary of that, they have little 
understanding about how that takes place or about the laws that govern those activities.20  In response, 
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marketers as well as some policymakers have exhorted people to read the privacy policies to find out 
what particular sites and apps do with their data.  Yet even some lawyers who write the policies for large 
companies have acknowledged to Joseph Turow that the documents are legal tender not designed to be 
understood by ordinary people.   
 
Indeed, in 2012 Lorrie Faith Cranor and Aleecia McDonald determined that if internet users read every 
privacy policy they encountered online they would spend 25 days a year engaged in this activity.21 But 
before trying to read privacy policies, Americans must have a realistic reason for clicking on them.  
Unfortunately, Annenberg surveys have repeatedly shown that large percentages of the population 
consumers are misled by the very term itself.  Illustrative is the finding of a 2009 Annenberg study that 
found 78 percent of respondents did not know the correct response –false – to the statement “If a website 
has a privacy policy, it means that the site cannot share information about you with other companies, 
unless you give the website your permission.”22 It’s clear that the very term privacy policy gives people 
an impression of marketers’ data sharing that experts agree is often quite unwarranted by the actual texts 
themselves. 
 
Some critics resist the cost-benefit explanation with explanations of the public’s ignorance that 
emphasize the difficulty of understanding the technological and institutional system.  Allessandro 
Acquisti, Curtis Taylor, and Liad Wagman, for example, note that “new search engines, social networks, 
e-commerce websites, web browsers, and individualized controls for privacy-conscious consumers have 
emerged.”23 They conclude, however, that “While overall, these technologies seemingly leave privacy 
choices in the hands of consumers, many (if not most) consumers, in practice, lack the awareness and 
technical sophistication required to protect and regulate the multiple dimensions of their personal 
information.”  Similarly, Gordon Hull emphasizes that “users do not and cannot plausibly be expected to 
know enough – neither about the uses to which their information might be put, nor about the specific 
benefits and harms that might result from those uses, nor about the likelihood that such harms might 
result – for consent to be meaningful, especially if one makes the assumption that those users are 
following a risk/benefit model of economic rationality.’24   
 
Note that the notion that people’s lack of knowledge leaves them vulnerable to giving up their 
information every day to advertisers and retailers has not moved regulators in the United States to 
action. With the exception of certain forms of health and financial information where potential harms 
can be identified and quantified, and barring children under 13 years old, companies continue to be free 
to collect huge streams of individuals’ data.  They are also free to construct profiles of individuals with 
the data, to share the data, and to treat people differently in the marketplace based on conclusions drawn 
from those hidden surveillance activities. Marketers, for their part, have not been dissuaded by the 
knowledge-failure argument from continuing to stress the cost-benefit approach as the reason people 
participate in interactions that involve the disclosure of their personal information.   
 
Both positions raise important questions for investigation.  The research on how little people know about 
what happens behind the screen leads us to disagree that the public’s acceptance of rational cost-benefit 
calculations explains the ease with which data retailers and advertisers retrieve information from 
individuals—though this proposition has never been directly tested.  At the same time, we fear that the 
most common alternative argument—that the public allows marketers its data out of knowledge 
failures—gets marketers off the hook too easily.  It permits them to blame schools and the media for not 
teaching people what they need to know about what happens behind their computer screens.  It lets them 
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point to online videos explaining what they do as well as to programs such as “Ad Choices” that allow 
people to opt out of targeted (or “interest based”) advertising.  And it also allows them to sound more 
optimistic about the public, to attribute to it more awareness and power, than those who allegedly 
denigrate “the value-exchange principle” marketers celebrate: “give the consumer more of what they 
care about and less of what they don’t.  It’s about surfacing value for users and advertisers alike.”25 
 
Concerned about these drawbacks, we began to consider an alternative understanding of the “privacy 
paradox” that is about far more than people’s cost-benefit analysis or their lack of knowledge.  It is 
about citizens’ belief they have no agency in a central area of democratic society: commerce.  More than 
a little anecdotal evidence suggested to us that people are making conscious decisions that it is futile to 
even try to cope with the data tide around them.  People we meet have decided they seriously cannot 
learn things, change government or business policy, or do anything else that will allow them to manage 
their personal information the way they want.  Moreover, they feel that they would face significant 
social and economic penalties if they were to opt-out of all the services of a modern economy that rely 
on an exchange of content for data. They have slid into resignation—a sense that that while they want 
control over their data world they will never achieve it.   
 
Frustration over lack of knowledge may have spurred this sense of resignation in many cases.  Yet we 
have noted that even people quite knowledgeable about how the data-world works believe they have 
little realistic alternative to letting their data flow.  They feel caught in the data-gathering marketing 
system for economic, social, and time-related reasons.  They know they will get good prices only if they 
carry their supermarket’s loyalty card; they believe they don’t have the time, knowledge, or energy to 
learn how to use anonymizers; their friends are interacting on Facebook and Instagram; and they know 
that erasing cookies increasingly doesn’t stop advertisers from tracking them, anyway.  The situation 
echoes what Mark Andrejevic describes as the digital enclosure: the circumstance when the 
contemporary digital retail economy compels consumers to disclose personal information or suffer 
negative consequences—the slower service, limited access to discounts, and content irrelevant to their 
interests—that result from opting out.26 
 
Someone observing the behaviors of consumers might believe people are indulging in tradeoffs when 
they are actually resigned to giving up data.  There need not be any differences between how individuals 
who are resigned and those who believe in tradeoffs act in marketing situations.  Our goal in conducting 
this survey was to look behind the activities to examine people’s beliefs about what they are doing and 
why.  How broadly does a sense of resignation exist among Americans?  How broadly does a belief in 
the appropriateness of tradeoffs exist among Americans?  How does people’s knowledge about everyday 
data gathering activities of marketers and the laws that govern them relate to their sense of resignation or 
belief in tradeoffs? And how do knowledge and resignation relate to people’s decisions in a realistic 
supermarket scenario that offers discount coupons for data?   
 
 
The Study and Its Population 
 
We explored these questions as part of a survey of Americans’ opinions about and understanding of a 
variety of online and offline privacy issues.  We cast our population net broadly.  We included people in 
our study if they were 18 years or older and said yes to one of the following questions: “Do you go 
online or use the internet, at least occasionally?” and “Do you send or receive email, at least 
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occasionally?” 
 
The survey questions included in this report focus on four areas.  One explores Americans’ attitudes 
regarding the fairness of three forms of marketing tradeoffs.  Another explores Americans’ beliefs 
regarding their ability to know about and exert control over the data marketers collect about them online.  
A third investigates people’s knowledge of rules of the marketplace when it comes to sharing 
information in the online and offline world as well as to change prices for individuals based on location, 
time of day, and an individual’s characteristics.  A fourth explores whether Americans would respond to 
a specific scenario in which the supermarket they “go to most often” will give them “discounts in 
exchange for its collecting information about all your grocery purchases.” 
 
The survey was conducted from February 23 to March 15, 2015 by Princeton Survey Research 
Associates International. PSRAI conducted telephone interviews with a nationally representative, 
English or Spanish speaking sample of 1,506 adult internet users living in the continental United States. 
A combination of landline (n=750) and wireless (n=756, including 412 without a landline phone) 
random digit dial (RDD) samples was used to represent all adults in the continental United States who 
have access to either a landline or cellular telephone. The interviews averaged 20 minutes. Based on a 7-
callback procedure and using the American Association of Public Opinion research (AAPOR) RR3 
method, a standard for this type of survey, the overall response rates were a rather typical 10 percent for 
the landline sample and 10 percent for the cellular sample. Statistical results are weighted to correct 
known demographic discrepancies.1 
 
The margin of sampling error for the complete set of weighted data is ±2.9 percent at the 95% 
confidence level. The margin of error is higher for smaller subgroups within the sample. 
Table 1 provides an introductory snapshot of the population we interviewed. As Table 1 indicates, 
women slightly outnumber men; 76% designate themselves as White, 11% identify themselves as 
Blacks or African American, Asians or Pacific Islanders comprise 4%, Native Americans comprise 
about 1%, and “mixed race” makes up 3%.  Hispanics (White and Black) comprise about 11% of the 
sample.  About 54% are under age 45.  Most have at least some higher education, and 30% report over 
$75,000 household income while 25% list it as below $30,000; 14% refused to reveal their household 
income.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 A two-stage procedure was used to weight this dual-frame sample. The first stage of weighting corrected for different 
probabilities of selection associated with the number of adults in each household and each respondent’s telephone usage 
patterns. This weighting also adjusts for the overlapping landline and cell sample frames and the relative sizes of each frame 
and each sample. 
 
The second stage of weighting balanced total sample demographics to population parameters. The total sample was balanced 
to match national population parameters for sex, age, education, race, Hispanic origin, region (U.S. Census definitions), 
population density, and telephone usage. The basic weighting parameters came from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2013 
American Community Survey data. The population density parameter was derived from Census 2010 data. The telephone 
usage parameter came from the analysis of the NHIS data (Blumberg SJ, Luke JV. Wireless substitution: Early release of 
estimates from the National Health Interview Survey, January-June, 2014. National Center for Health Statistics. Dec 2014). 
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Consumers Reject Tradeoffs as Unfair 
 
To assess marketers’ claim that Americans are generally positive toward allowing the collection of data 
about it in return for some advantage, we asked our respondents whether they agree or disagree three 
types of tradeoffs are “fair” or “OK.” We presented the tradeoffs together with five other attitude 
statements in random order so as not to call attention to our particular interest in the cost-benefit  
 
 
Table 1:  Characteristics of U.S. Adults in Sample (N=1,506)* 
 % 
Sex  
Male 48 
Female 52 
Age  
18-24 14 
25-34 21 
35-49 30 
50-64 26 
65-89   9 
Race   
White  76 
Black or African American 11 
Asian or Pacific Islander   4 
American Indian or Alaskan Native   2 
Mixed Race   3 
Other/Don’t Know/Refused   3 
Hispanic or Latino Background?  
Yes 11 
No 88 
Don’t Know/Refused   1 
Household Income Last Year  
Under $30,000 25 
$30,000 to under $50,000 19 
$50,000 to under $75,000 12 
$75,000 and Over 30 
Don’t Know/Refused 14 
Highest Education Level  
Less than high school graduate   7 
High school/tech school graduate 
Some college                                                                
College graduate or more 
25 
33 
34 
No answer   1 
* In this and all other tables, when the numbers don’t add to 100% it is because of a rounding error. 
 
 
 
  
Turow, Hennessy, Draper  Page 12 of 24 
calculations. Listed in Table 2, each of the tradeoff propositions depicts an everyday data-collection 
approach as well as a common privilege (discount, improved service or use of a store’s wireless internet) 
marketers claim to present in return.  Note that despite these activities happening all around them, large 
majorities of Americans believe each form of exchange is not acceptable.  Moreover, as Table 2 
indicates, their rejection is firm: by far the largest majority of naysayers say they “disagree strongly.” 
 
 
Table 2: Americans’ Responses to Tradeoff-Attitude Statements (N=1,506) 
 Strongly 
Agree 
(%) 
Agree
(%) 
Disagree 
(%) 
Strongly 
Disagree
(%) 
Neither* 
(%) 
If companies give me a discount, it is a fair 
exchange for them to collect information about 
me without my knowing it. (91% disagree) 
3 5 14 77 1 
It’s fair for an online of physical store to monitor 
what I’m doing online when I’m there, in 
exchange for letting me use the store’s wireless 
internet, or Wi-Fi, without charge.  (71% 
disagree) 
9 18 18 53     2 
It’s OK if a store where I shop uses information it 
has about me to create a picture of me that 
improves the services they provide for me. (55% 
disagree) 
12 30 17 38 3 
*Neither was a volunteered answer.   
 
 
Further analysis of these responses indicates only a very small percentage of Americans totally agree 
with the overall concept of marketing tradeoffs: about 4% agree or agree strongly with all three 
propositions.  To allow for a broader interpretation of a belief in tradeoffs we created a tradeoff-
acceptance index that gave a value to each answer—5 to strongly agree, 4 to agree, 3 to neither agree  
nor disagree, 2 to disagree and 1 to strongly disagree.  We then calculated the average scores 
respondents had on the three statements to see how many averaged disagreement or agreement with the 
statements.  We found that even using from this broader measure a small proportion—21%—believes 
common tradeoffs with marketers amount to a fair deal—in contrast to what marketers posit as the major 
reason for people giving up their data.    
 
 
The Supermarket Scenario and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
We then evaluated a form of the privacy paradox.  After a block of attitude questions unrelated to 
tradeoffs, we presented our respondents with a more concrete data-exchange situation than the ones we 
used in the tradeoff-attitude statements.  “For the next few questions,” the interviewer said, “please think 
about the supermarket you go to most often. Let’s say this supermarket says it will give you discounts in 
exchange for its collecting information about all your grocery purchases.  Would you accept the offer or 
not?”   
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A majority, 52%, say they will not, but 43% reply they will accept supermarket scenario, and 4% 
volunteer “it depends”—more than twice as many as in even the broad definition of tradeoff supporters.  
On the surface, the percentage accepting is quite similar to the 45% who agree with the third statement 
in Table 2.  Further analysis, though, indicates the overlap of individuals is far from complete:  40% of 
those who accept the supermarket discount do not concur that “It’s OK if a store where I shop uses 
information it has about me to create a picture of me that improves the services they provide for me.”  
This lack of correspondence even when the scenarios appear similar underscores that a small percentage 
consistently accept the idea of tradeoffs.   
 
We wanted to know whether people who say they will accept the supermarket discount would still do it 
when presented with specific assumptions a supermarket might make about them from analyzing their 
grocery-purchasing habits.  This is knowledge Americans almost never receive directly but may intuit in 
real life as a result of ads and coupons they believe are targeted to them.  The categories the interviewers 
presented ran the gamut from generalizations that focus directly on buying habits (“whether you tend to 
buy low-fat foods”) to lifestyle inferences (for example, “when you take vacations”) to demographic 
inferences (“your racial or ethnic background”) to medical generalizations (“the health status of you or 
someone in your family”). For each one, the interviewers asked whether respondents would accept the 
general discount offer under the new specific condition. 
 
Table 3 presents their answers. It shows the limits of cost-benefit analysis (and the privacy paradox) as a 
rationale for marketers’ claim that most people will provide personal data in exchange for store deals.  
There is a substantial drop in the percentage of people who say they will accept the discount when 
confronted with what the supermarket will infer about them.  Moreover, we find that the categories 
make up an ordered difficulty index indicating sensitivity: individuals who say they won’t exchange data 
for a certain trade-off topic (for example, “when you take vacations”) also won’t exchange data for the 
topics below it in the index.2   
 
Clearly, the percentage of Americans who seem even on the surface to accept a cost-benefit analysis 
does not exceed 43%.  And when we ask people directly to think about the implications of what they 
provide to marketers, they balk, and the acceptance level goes down to around 20%.  This decline is not 
consistent with marketers’ assertions that people are giving up their personal information because of 
cost-benefit analysis.  In the supermarket scenarios, they are doing just the opposite: resisting the idea of 
giving data for discounts.   
 
 
Most Americans are resigned and they far outnumber tradeoff supporters  
 
Here is where we begin to explore an alternative view, our resignation hypothesis.  The meaning of 
resignation we intend is, to quote a Google dictionary entry, “the acceptance of something undesirable 
but inevitable.”27  Asking our respondents whether they agree or disagree with two statements, we 
investigated how much of the population can be described as resigned when it comes to marketers 
                                                 
2 Using these data combined with those 52% who said they would not accept any kind of supermarket discount we created a 
supermarket-tradeoff index measure which goes from 0 if a person said they would not accept any supermarket discount to 9 
if a respondent said they would accept a supermarket discount and also accepted all specific discounts based on shopping and 
demographic characteristics listed in Table 3.  Note that nine percent of the respondents had the highest possible value of this 
index. 
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learning about their behavior online.  One statement was “I want to have control over what marketers 
can learn about me online.”  The other was “I’ve come to accept that I have little control over what 
marketers can learn about me.”  We presented these statements in random order among a series of six 
agree/disagree propositions so that the respondents wouldn’t see the relationship between the two or 
suspect our intention.  To be identified as resigned, a person had to agree with both of them. 
 
Table 3: Percentage of people who accept the supermarket offer and know supermarket will 
analyze grocery their purchases to make particular assumptions about them— 
N=1506 
    Yes  
  (%) 
   
Accept the discounts without any specific assumptions added 43    
Accept the discount knowing supermarket will make 
assumptions about    
 
Whether you tend to buy low-fat foods 33    
Whether you have children and how old they are 27    
What activities you might do outside of work  25    
When you take vacations 22    
The health status of you or someone in your family 21    
How much money you make 21    
Whether you are going through a major life event  19    
Your racial or ethnic background    19    
 
 
Table 4 presents their answers to the statements.  The percentage of people agreeing with the first one 
(84%) is higher than the second, where agreement is nevertheless quite high (65%).  When we 
investigated the overlap that designates resignation, we found that a majority of the population—58%—
is resigned.  We also found widespread suspicion based on another statement we gave them: 72% of 
Americans reject the idea that “what companies know about me from my behavior online cannot hurt 
me.”  If we combine the people who are resigned with those who believe what firms know can hurt 
them, we find that 41% of Americans are not only resigned, they hold a dark concern that the basic 
dynamics of the emerging marketplace will cause them injury—and that they cannot control it. 
 
Table 4: Americans’ Responses to the Resignation Attitude Statements (N=1,506) 
 Strongly 
Agree 
(%) 
Agree
(%) 
Disagree
(%) 
Strongly 
Disagree
(%) 
 
Neither* 
(%) 
 
DK 
(%) 
I want to have control over what 
marketers can learn about me 
online.  (84% agree) 
61 23 8 7 1 
 
1 
I’ve come to accept that I have little 
control over what marketers can 
learn about me online.  (65% 
agree) 
31 34 16 18       1 
      
     1 
*”Neither” was a volunteered answer. 
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In the abstract, behaviors driven by cost-benefit analyses and those driven by resignation may look the 
same.  When we looked in our scenario at the people who agreed to give up their data for supermarket 
discounts, we found important differences between tradeoff supporters and people who are resigned.  
There is a strong positive statistical relationship (.56) between the tradeoff index (based on the three 
statements in Table 2) and accepting or rejecting various kinds of supermarket discounts.  By contrast, 
there is no statistical relationship (-.01) between being resigned to marketers’ use of data and accepting 
or rejecting various kinds of supermarket discounts.  Put another way, people who believe in tradeoffs 
give up their data predictably, while people who are resigned don’t do it in a predictable manner.  They 
do give up their data, though.  In fact, we found that 57% of those who took the supermarket deal were 
resigned.  By contrast, a much smaller 32% were “tradeoff” supporters even using the broader measure 
of tradeoff support.   
 
The larger percentages of people in the population who are resigned compared to people who believe in 
tradeoffs indicate that in the real world people who exchange their data for benefits are more likely to do 
it while resigned rather than as the result of cost-benefit analysis.  Moreover, resignation is widespread 
across the U.S. population.  As Figure 1 indicates, age and gender show no differences in resignation. 
When it comes to education and race, statistically significant differences do show up: higher resignation 
percentages for Whites compared to non-Whites and for the more educated people compared with 
respondents who have a high school education or less.  At the same time, those comparison show that 
50% or more of the individuals in most categories of respondents are resigned. 
 
 
Figure 1: Percentage of Resigned Respondents by Demographic Groups 
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Americans often don’t have the basic knowledge to make informed cost-benefit choices 
 
To further question marketers’ emphasis that Americans use cost-benefit calculations, we found that 
large percentages of Americans often don’t have the basic knowledge to make informed cost-benefit 
choices about ways marketers use their information.  Reinforcing these inaccuracies, large percentages 
of Americans overestimate the extent to which the government protects them from discriminatory 
pricing—the act of changing prices from person to person based on those individuals’ consumer 
profiles.  Table 5 presents the answers our respondents gave to 13 statements about how marketers use 
their information and the regulations relating to personalized pricing. For each statement, we asked the 
person “whether you think it is true or false.  If you are unsure, just say so.”  The bolded number  
 
Table 5: True-False statements about how marketers use information and regulations related to 
personalized pricing  (N=1,506) 
 True 
(%) 
False 
(%) 
DK 
(%) 
Wrong 
(%) 
It is possible for Facebook to link what people do when they 
access the internet on a laptop computer with what they 
do on their cell phones’ or tablets’ apps. 74 12 14 
 
 
   26 
It is legal for an online store to charge people different prices 
depending on where they are located. 63 26 10 
 
   36 
When I allow a mobile app to know my location, that app is 
legally allowed to share that location with another 
company. 62 26 12 
 
 
    38 
A company can tell that I have opened its email even if I 
don’t respond. 61 27 13 
 
    40 
By law, stores that provide free wireless internet, or Wi-Fi, 
have to secure the service so nobody can track what 
customers who are using it are doing online. 29 59 11 
 
 
    40 
By law, my supermarket must obtain my permission first 
before selling information about my food purchases to 
other companies. 38 51 11 
 
 
     49 
Banks often send their customers emails that ask them to 
click on a link wanting them to verify their account. 43 49   8 
 
     51 
By law, a travel site such as Expedia or Orbitz that compares 
prices on different airlines must include the lowest airline 
prices. 38 47 15 
 
 
     53 
It is legal for an ONLINE store to charge different people 
different prices at the same time of day. 44 42 13 
                 
55 
It is legal for an OFFLINE or PHYSICAL store to charge 
different people different prices at the same time of day. 38 50 12 
 
     62  
When a website has a privacy policy, it means the site will 
not share my information with other websites or 
companies without my permission. 58 35 7 
 
 
      65 
If I want to be sure not to be tracked on my cell phone, I 
should clear the phone’s cookies. 46 35 18 
 
      64 
By law, my pharmacy must obtain my permission first before 
selling information about the over-the-counter drugs I 
buy to other companies. 56 31 13 
 
 
      69 
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indicates the percentage that got the correct answer; the last column indicates the percentage who didn’t 
get the answer correct (that is, the percent wrong plus the percentage who don’t know or are unsure).   
 
The table reveals a range of difficulty, with 5 statements where 40% or less didn’t know the correct 
answer and 8 answers where from 49% to 69% didn’t know the correct answer.  A separate analysis 
revealed that half of the population got only six or fewer answers correct, while 32% got seven to nine 
questions right, and 17% were correct on ten to thirteen of the statements.  Only 3% excelled at knowing 
all but two of the statements. 
 
Overall, the table indicates large gaps in knowledge about basic data-marketing rules among large 
percentages of Americans.  In addition to legal activities Americans cannot evaluate correctly, 51% of 
Americans cannot recognize the possibility of “phishing,” an illegal activity where thieves posing as  
banks or other organizations with important data ask customers “to click on a link wanting them to 
verify their account.”  Moreover, large percentages of the population believe incorrectly that 
government laws protect them from price discrimination and certain forms of data collection.   
 
These widespread misconceptions suggest that even when Americans do weigh the costs and benefits of 
giving up their data, they frequently base those choices on incorrect information.   
 
 
More knowledge predicts being resigned and giving up data in the supermarket scenario 
 
While the low knowledge level of Americans about how marketers use their information makes it 
unlikely they could carry out correct costs-benefit calculations in the digital-marketing environment, 
having more knowledge is not the protective feature that academics have suggested. We found that those 
who know more about the marketing laws and practices are more likely to be resigned.  Moreover, 
resigned people’s decisions to accept supermarket discounts even when the supermarket collects 
increasingly personal information is also positively related to knowledge.   
 
To demonstrate, we use our knowledge index based on the 13 items presented in Table 5.3  When we 
explore how being resigned is associated with the knowledge index, we get a plot with a significant 
positive slope, shown in Figure 2.  The plot shows that the more a person knows about information 
collection in the marketing world, the more likely the resignation.  In this context, knowledge definitely 
does not go along with a sense of power.  To the contrary, our survey finds that when it comes to 
protecting their personal data, those with the wherewithal to accurately calculate the costs and benefits 
of privacy are likely to consider their efforts futile. 
 
Resignation and increasing knowledge also work together when it comes to consumers’ exchanging 
their grocery-buying data for discounts in the supermarket scenario. Figure 3 plots that interaction based 
on multiple regression analysis predicting the supermarket trade-off index (the number of data topics a 
person is willing to exchange) controlling for age, race, and gender.  It shows that the likelihood of a 
person giving more data, and more sensitive data (because it is an ordered-difficulty index), goes up 
more sharply with increasing knowledge when the person is not resigned.  The figure does indicate, 
                                                 
3 For this analysis, we combined the respondents who got all the questions correct (a score of 13) with those who got 12 
correct because the number of respondents with all correct was quite low (N = 9). 
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though, that resignation associates with more rather than less knowledge when it comes to predicting 
that a person will choose to exchange data for supermarket discounts.  
 
 
Figure 2: Resignation and Knowledge (N = 1,506; brackets define 95% confidence intervals) 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Interaction Plot of Knowledge and Resignation Predicting Supermarket Tradeoff Index 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
Our hope is that the results from our nationally representative survey of Americans will encourage new 
perspectives on the problems swirling around consumer marketers’ relationships with the public.  One 
issue raised by the findings is that Americans’ are resigned regarding their ability to control the 
information marketers can collect and use about them. Resigned individuals may behave in ways that 
allow marketers to claim they are unconcerned or accept the economic logic that insists people trade 
their data for benefits.  We found instead that most Americans reject this logic. They also express 
concerns about how their data are being used and don’t believe marketers give them input into it.  A 
consequence of this broad sense of futility, perhaps even disrespect, is that over the next decades 
Americans might reject the legitimacy of a central institution: marketing and consumer commerce.  This 
will have a destabilizing ripple effect on many aspects of American life. 
 
The futility over information control we are seeing in the public sphere is disrupting a compact that 
commercial marketers made with Americans through the past century.  As historian William Leach 
notes, a key development of the past one hundred and fifty years was the “democratization of desire.”  It 
involved the reimagining of democracy beyond politics to Americans’ “equal rights to desire the same 
goods” and have access to them in a shared public marketplace.28  Leach and others note that the 
democratization of desire had some not-so-attractive aspects; moreover, the ideal never fully took hold.  
Nevertheless, the growth of posted prices (as opposed to haggling in response to prices that vary by 
individuals or groups) and the open presentation of goods (as opposed to different goods offered to 
different people based on merchants’ preconceived conceptions of them) are two features of the 
standardized marketplace that have leveled opportunities for shoppers.   
 
One underappreciated consequence of marketers’ 21st century data activities is that these and related 
features of the democratized marketplace are beginning to disappear.  With the rise of personalization as 
a strategy, advertisers and retailers are changing prices for individuals (often through targeted discounts) 
when they shop at home, at work, and even in physical aisles, based on what the sellers know about 
them.  Advertisers and retailers are also changing the goods they highlight for people based on the 
profiles they have created about them from their own and other online and offline information sources.  
Although some online firms have been allowing Americans to see some of the data points they hold 
about them, the particulars of how and when they use these profiles—and with what other sources of 
information—is a mystery in almost all cases. It is evident that the amount of information marketers 
have already collected is enormous.  For example, the Forrester Research consultancy estimated in 2014 
that database marketing firm Acxiom has about 1,500 data points for each of over 500 million active 
internet users, most of them in the United States.29  Another 2014 Forrester report looked to not-too-
distant circumstances where marketers would routinely make decisions based on “a customer’s circle of 
social relationships and influencers...sensor data [from in-store technologies], streaming real-time data, 
acquired data [from firms such as Acxiom]...anything.”30 
 
Americans surely sense the changes that are happening and feel powerless to do anything about them.   
Our finding that 58% of Americans are resigned to not having a say in these activities—that they do not 
want to lose control over their information but also believe their loss of control has already happened—
suggests the population feels a lack of autonomy even at this early date in the shift away from a 
democratized marketplace.  We also found widespread suspicion: 72% of Americans reject the idea that 
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“what companies know about me from my behavior online cannot hurt me.”  When we combined the 
people who are resigned with those who believe what firms know can hurt them, we found that 41% of 
Americans are not only resigned, they hold a dark concern that the basic dynamics of the emerging 
marketplace will cause them injury—and that they cannot control it. 
 
Marketing and retailing executives have typically played down any concerns about their use of shopper 
data.  One way has been to depict an empowered public that accepts the notion that it is releasing data 
willingly as a tradeoff for benefits it receives.  Our survey challenges marketers’ typical cost-benefit-
analysis defense by showing quite clearly that most Americans do not accept the fairness of getting 
discounts in trade for their data.  But as controversies around data mining and predictive analytics have 
swirled around the National Security Agency as well as around tracking by businesses to ferret out 
people with particular diseases, financial issues, or sexual orientations, marketers have taken pains to 
separate out tracking people for the purposes of ordinary advertising and shopping. Consider the 
comments of Scott Howe, President and CEO of Acxiom: 
 
Some believe that all data is of equal importance and therefore must be controlled in exactly the 
same way. This is just not the case. Data regarding personal information that pertains to 
employment or insurability decisions, or that relates to sensitive health-related issues or 
confidential matters, deserves much different treatment than data that would indicate that I am a 
sports fan. Too often, legislation and regulation seek to paint issues in broad strokes, often with 
unforeseen consequences to liberties and innovation, despite being born of the best intentions.31 
 
Apart from ignoring the issue of information respect—that Americans want to be able to manage their 
data in commerce—this view pushes aside the discriminatory potential that seemingly benign pieces of 
data can have on the opportunities people can have in the public sphere.  In the not-too-distant future, 
companies may well merge the category “sports fan” with dozens of other characteristics about an 
individuals’ eating habits (at the ballpark, for example), income, number and age of children, house 
value, vacation habits, mobile-tracked locations, clothes-shopping habits, and media-use patterns to 
create profiles that dub them winners or losers regarding certain areas of shopping and the 
advertisements related to them.  For reasons they don’t understand, people may see patterns of discounts 
that suggest they are being siloed into certain lifestyle segments.  Certain advertisers may support their 
media habits but not, perhaps, to the extent that advertisers support neighbors or co-workers.  The 
individuals will vaguely understand that their profiles are the cause, and they may try to change their 
behavior to get better deals, often without success, all the while wondering why “the system”—the 
opaque under-the-hood predictive analytics regimes that they know are tracking their lives but to which 
they have no access—is treating them that way. 
 
Arguments that play down the profound discriminatory potential of this sort of data-driven consumer 
commerce have the same rhetorical aims as arguments that insist Americans’ want to exchange data for 
benefits:  They give policymakers false justifications for enabling the collection and use of all kinds of 
consumer data often in ways that the public find objectionable.  Yet when 3 of every 5 Americans are 
resigned to lack of control over their data relationships with marketers, when 2 of every 5 are both 
resigned to marketer control over their data and worried that the control can hurt them, and when people 
with knowledge are actually more likely rather than less likely to be resigned, we have a problem.  The 
findings indicate substantial tensions in a central area of society’s public sphere that cannot be swept 
away by executives’ assertions of consumer autonomy and rational choice. 
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Unfortunately, the social and institutional harms we have identified here don’t map easily onto the 
concept of harms used by the Federal Trade Commission and other government organizations.  As the 
FTC itself noted in a 2010 report, approaches to protecting consumer privacy that employ a harm-based 
model tend to focus on enhancing physical security, limiting economic injury, and minimizing unwanted 
intrusions into the daily lives of consumers.32 The report goes on to note that such an approach tends to 
leave out reputational harm and the pervasive fear many Americans face of being watched—issues that 
certainly intersect with concerns we have found in this survey.  Yet the concerns we have identified are 
both more specific and broader:  Americans want to have control over the data marketers use about 
them. They believe that marketers keep that data control for themselves. They worry (perhaps because 
of that lack of autonomy) that the commercial relationships they have are dangerous. And they feel 
resigned to not being able to do anything about it. 
 
At heart here is an asymmetrical relationship between what marketers know about Americans and 
whether Americans can learn what that information is and how it’s being used.  The term transparency is 
used a lot in the marketing trade press to signify advertisers’ insistence that they must be able to look 
into the specifics of their programmatic-advertising activities so that they can calculate their return on 
investment and not get harmed monetarily.  Yet when it comes to transparency in advertisers’ 
relationships with the public, the term is far less popular—and the activities related to implementing 
openness far less diligent.  We need initiatives that will give members of the public the right and ability 
to learn what companies know about them, how they profile them, and what data lead to what 
personalized offers.  We also need to get people excited about using that right and ability.  Here are a 
few suggestions:  
 
 One way to encourage more corporate openness about the commercial use of people’s data may 
be by naming, praising, and shaming. Public interest organizations as well as government 
agencies should develop clear definitions of transparency that reflect concerns identified in this 
survey and elsewhere.  They should then systematically call out companies regarding how well 
or badly they are doing based on these values. When activists, journalists, and government 
officials name, praise, and shame firms that don’t abide by the transparency norms, they can alert 
the public to stay away from bad actors and possibly force those actors to change their behaviors.   
 
 We also suggest an initiative to dissect and report on the implications of privacy policies. 
Activists, journalists and government officials—perhaps aided by crowdsourcing initiatives—
should take on the role of interpreting these legally-binding documents for the public.  The focus 
should not primarily be on whether or not websites abide by their privacy policies.  Instead, 
privacy-policy interpreters can be most helpful by uncovering for their publics how companies 
say they collect and use their data, and what the implications might be for the individual and 
society.  When this information is available in a digestible form, it may spur informed naming, 
praising, and shaming.  It may well also lead firms to change behaviors citizens find 
disagreeable. 
  
 These considerations along with our overall survey findings suggest a need to advocate for the 
right to know one’s profile and how it is used. As long as the algorithms companies implement to 
analyze and predict the future behaviors of individuals are hidden from public view, the potential 
for unwanted marketer exploitation of individuals’ data remains high. We therefore ought to 
consider it an individual’s right to access the profiles and scores companies use to create every 
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personalized message and discount the individual receives.   Companies will push back that 
giving out this information will expose trade secrets.  We argue there are ways to carry this out 
while keeping their trade secrets intact. 
 
Without access to this information, individuals will continue to feel disempowered and disrespected by 
companies.  Moreover, the very institution of consumer commerce may be threatened in ways that 
damage the broad canvas of American life. 
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